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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
Louisiana. The Uniform Narcotics Act1 as adopted by Louisiana
provides a mandatory sentence of from ten to fifteen years for
those convicted under the Act of such activities as possession,
control and transportation of narcotics.2 The Act also makes the
offenders ineligible for parole.3 In State v. Roth4 the defendant
was indicted on a charge of possession, control and transporta-
tion of marijuana, a narcotic drug. He moved to quash the indict-
ment, one ground of the motion being that the Act, in providing
a mandatory sentence without right of parole, violated the con-
stitutional prohibition in the Eighth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution against the infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ments.
After the motion to quash was overruled, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to six years at hard labor. Upon appeal
the conviction was affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana pointed out that there was
no violation of the Federal Constitution since its prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments is a limitation upon the
Federal Government, not the states. In regard to similar provisions
of state constitutions, they were held to apply to the form or
nature of the punishment rather than to its duration. In view of
the moral degeneracy involved in a narcotics crime, six years at
hard labor was found not to be disproportionate to the offense.
In respect to the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the
Eighth Amendment, the Louisiana court is on firm ground, for it
was early held that the. first eight Amendments to the Federal
1 23 LA. REv. STAT. (West, 1951) §§ 40:961-1022.
2§ 40:981.
3 Ibid.
4 ------ La ....... ,69 So. 2d 741 (1953).
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Constitution were limitations upon the Federal Government only,
and not upon the states.'
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 changed
this. This Amendment provides: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The
Supreme Court of the United States did not take long to reject
the idea that the Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporated
the first eight Amendments in their entirety. In the famous Slaugh-
ter House Cases' it was laid down that the privileges and immuni-
ties of the Fourteenth Amendment are very limited in scope and
are only such as arise out of the nature and essential character
of the national government, or are specifically granted or secured
to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United States.7
There is a different situation in regard to the Due Process
Clause. At first the doctrine was announced that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily incor-
porate the Eighth Amendment so as to restrain a state from in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishments.' However, over a period
of time and a process of judicial construction the Supreme Court
has come around to the view that the Due Process Clause does
secure certain fundamental rights against deprivation by state
authority. Justice Cardozo concluded in Palko v. Connecticut' that
certain rights have been taken from these first Amendments and
brought within the Due Process Clause by absorption. Whether or
not a right is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is determined
5 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
6 16 Wall. 36 ( U. S. 1873).
For example: (1) the right of citizens to come from one part of the country to
another; (2) the right to demand the care and protection of the Federal Government
over one's life, liberty or property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of
a foreign government; (3) the right to assemble peaceably and to petition for redress
of grievances; (4) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
8 Collins v. Johnson, 237 U.S. 502 (1915) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
9 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
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by deciding if the denial of the particular right would violate
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which are the
foundation stones of our civil and political institutions."
The recent case of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber" seems
to make it reasonably certain that the Supreme Court, when the
question is squarely presented to it, will hold that cruel and unusual
punishment by a state violates the "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice" test. The facts were that a convicted murderer
was placed in an electric chair to be executed, but he was not
executed because the apparatus did not function properly. A sec-
ond date for the execution was set by the governor, but in the
interim the prisoner contended that the state in subjecting him to
a second attempt would be inflicting a cruel and unusual punish-
ment. In overruling his contention, the court was of the opinion
that no case of cruel and unusual punishment was spelled out,
but that, if one had been spelled out, the due process guaranty
would have been violated. It was stated:
Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear in our
Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth would prohibit by its due process
clause execution by a state in a cruel manner. 12
What is cruel and unusual punishment? The terminology im-
plies something which amounts to physical torture or to such
punishment as would by its very character shock the minds of
persons possessed of the ordinary feelings of humanity. Weems
v. U. S. 3 held that a punishment was cruel which consisted of
imprisonment in chains, complete isolation from the outside world,
and imposition of permanent civil disabilities. Likewise, it was
held cruel to chain a prisoner by the neck so that he could not
lie or sit for several hours. 4 Another example is Howard v. State, 5
10 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926).
11329 U. S. 459 (1947).
12d. at 463.
13217 U. S. 349 (1910).
141n re Birdsong, 39 Fed. 599 (S. D. Ga. 1899).
15 28 Ariz. 433, 237 Pac. 203 (1925).
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wherein the Arizona Supreme Court declared that, while a prison
superintendent has authority to punish for infraction of prison
rules, to subject an offender to thirty days' deprivation of all food
save bread and water and to five months' solitary confinement
without cause was illegal. In still another case involving a fugitive,
a federal court was of the opinion that punishments meted out to
prisoners in a Georgia chain gang were cruel and unusual.16
Taking into consideration the above examples and the fact that
sentences to hard labor are more common than unusual, it is diffi-
cult to conceive of the United States Supreme Court holding a
sentence of six years at hard labor without right of parole to be
a cruel and unusual punishment.
STATE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM INTERSTATE TRANSACTIONS
Oklahoma. The perennial question as to when a state may tax
an interstate business was raised once more in Southwestern Gas
& Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission.7 A Delaware corpo-
ration appealed from an order of the Oklahoma Tax Commission
assessing income taxes on the corporation based upon its net in-
come allocable to the property and operations of the corporation
in Oklahoma. The corporation had no employees, officials, or di-
rectors in Oklahoma; generated no electricity in Oklahoma; made
no sales of current in Oklahoma; did no banking business in
Oklahoma; and directly captured no income in Oklahoma. The
business done in the state encompassed only the ownership of 137
miles of transmission line from Weleetka, Oklahoma, to the Ar.
kansas line. Electric current was purchased in Weleetka, trans-
mitted over the 137 miles of line in Oklahoma, and then sold in
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas.
Before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma the corporation con-
tended that the state income tax was unconstitutional under the
10 Johnson v. Dye, 175 F. 2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949).
1 -- Okla.----, 253 P. 2d 549 (1953).
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Commerce and Due Process Clauses because in the situation at
hand there was no local or intrastate business and because there
was no direct capturing of income within the state.
The tax was upheld by the court. The business was found to be
"obviously unitary." As such, in view of the fact that the net in-
come accrued to the business as a whole, it was said to be clear
that a state may tax that portion of a corporation's income attribut-
able to property owned within the state."
The Oklahoma statute was unambiguous in setting forth a very
inclusive definition of doing business for purposes of taxation.
Indeed, the statute declared: "The terms 'transacting business'
and 'business transacted' are used herein in their broadest sense."19
This language, added to the fact that the corporation was qualified
to do business in Oklahoma and did in actuality carry on in Okla-
homa a substantial part of its normal business of owning trans-
mission lines and transmitting current, precluded the argument
that no business was done in the state.20
But what of the argument that the income taxed was not cap-
tured in Oklahoma, that it, therefore, accrued wholly from inter-
state commerce, and that the taxation was unconstitutional as being
imposed on interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution
of the United States? The court held that purely interstate com-
merce is not exempt per se from a net income tax imposed by a
state. McGoldrick v. Berwin-White Coal Mining Co., cited by the
court, is to the following effect: "A tax may be levied on net in-
come wholly derived from interstate commerce. Non-discrimina-
tory taxation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is not
prohibited."'" Quoting further from the same case,22 the court
said that an interstate business may be required to bear its just
18 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920).
19 68 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) § 874 (o).
20 See 20 C. J. S., Corporations, § 1829.
21309 U. S. 33, 47 (1940).
22 Ibid.
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share of the tax burdens of the state. The corporation was the
beneficiary of the substantial privilege of carrying on a portion
of its business in the state, and this privilege was not a complete
gratuity. In a nutshell the test for the validity of the taxation ques-
tioned was stated to be: "Has the state given the interstate busi-
ness anything for which it can ask return?"2 Here the answer
was, "Yes." Thus, the conclusion was that the transaction of intra-
state business or the capturing of income within the state was not
a condition precedent to Oklahoma's taxing of the corporation's
net income.
The Oklahoma holding is indisputably in line with the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in regard to a state's taxing
of the net income derived within it from interstate commerce.24
Taxation of net income is distinguished from taxation of gross
income. The latter is held to be an immediate burden upon inter-
state commerce on the ground that it does not take into considera-
tion the profitableness of the commerce. A tax on net profits is in-
direct and incidental in regard to interstate commerce and does
not have the same onerous effect because it is in harmony with
the net profit to the interstate business and hence is not a detri-
ment to it. The result is that a tax on net income is a proper man-
ner in which interstate commerce may be made to pay its fair
share of the expenses of local government.25
Assuming that the character of the state taxation is constitu-
tional, is the method of imposition and allocation valid and equit.
able? It was admitted here that the corporation's business was
unitary in character. Thus it could be valued as units for taxa-
tion. A state, in taxing a foreign corporation, is limited to the
value of the corporation's property within the state. But it is
common knowledge that the value of property alone may not
23 State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940).
24 Barrett, "Substance" v. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to
State Taxation, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 740 (1953).
25 Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249 (1946) ; Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler,
315 U. S. 649 (1942) ; United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1919).
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nearly approach the value of the same property as it is used in
a system in connection with the use of other property. Thus, the
unit theory of valuation in taxation of interstate commerce is per-
mitted under the rationale that property used in one portion of
a business tends to make property in the other portions of the
business more valuable. Since the property in a state has a proper
value only in its relation to other out-of-state property, a state
may treat the property within its confines as a "unit" of the entire
business, without coming within the interdiction of the rule against
taxing out-of-state property.26
The Oklahoma statute rests its formula for the taxation of the
corporation's business upon the ratio between property, expense
and sales within and without the state. This would seem to be a
fair and proper application of the unit rule of valuation. The
complaint that no income was directly captured in Oklahoma
would seem to be equalized by the provision in the formula relat-
ing to sales. The ratio of sales in Oklahoma to total sales would
be zero to total sales, and it is too obvious for remark that this
part of the formula would lead to little or no tax. Similar reason-
ing applies to the items of property and expense in Oklahoma. All
that is involved in regard to these two items is the value and ex-
pense of caring for a mere 137 miles of power line.27
Returning, then, to the original test expounded by the court,
the answer must be that the state has given to the interstate busi-
ness benefits, such as the privilege to do business therein, for
which it may ask return in the form of a tax.28
26 Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942) ; 27 Am. Jun., Income Taxes,
§ 193.
27 See Silverstein, Problems of Apportionment in Taxation of Multistate Business,
4 Tax. L. Rev. 207 (1949).
28 See HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953) ; Barrett, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce - "Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What
Have You? 4 Va. L. Rev. 496 (1951) ; Cox, Interstate Commerce and a State's Right to
Revenue, 30 Taxes 25 (1952) ; but cf. Clark, Interstate Commerce and a State's Right
to Revenue: A Rejoinder, 30 Taxes 263 (1952).
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LICENSE TAXES UPON INTERSTATE SALES
Oklahoma. In Bossert v. City of Okmulgee29 a Tennessee cor-
poration, having neither property nor place of business in Okla-
homa, used traveling salesmen to solicit orders for the sale of
photographs in Oklahoma. The City of Okmlugee levied a tax
of $3.00 per day on solicitors who went from door to door selling
such items as photographs and works of art. The defendant solici-
tor was fined for not paying the license fee, and she appealed,
charging among other things that the city ordinance imposing the
tax was unconstitutional as imposing a discriminatory tax on inter-
state commerce.
The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma held that the tax
was clearly unconstitutional in that it was discriminatory against
the "drummer" or itinerant traveling salesman. The tax was dis-
criminatory in that no provision was made for taxing a firm which
maintained a local office and could solicit orders by telephone,
mail, newspapers or radio.
The decision is based on the case of Nippert v. City of Rich-
mond,"o which recognizes the accepted doctrine that even interstate
commerce may be taxed locally so as to pay its own way so long
as the taxation is not discriminatory. This means that the tax
"must not only be non-discriminatory on its face, but it must be
non-discriminatory in its practical effect as well." 1 Under the
ordinance in question, if one did not make a personal solicita-
tion of an order, i.e., if one could, for example, establish a local
office and solicit by telephone, he would not be subject to the tax.
The obvious result was that a transient, lacking the financial re-
sources to obtain orders other than by personal solicitation, was
discriminated against in that he came within the ordinance and
29 -----Okla. Crim. Rep ..... 260 P. 2d 429 (1953).
30 327 U. S. 416 (1946). Discussions of this case may be found in Recent Decisions,
44 Mich. L. Rev. 1135 (1946) ; Recent Cases, 20 Temp. L. Q. 586 (1947). See also Note,
162 A.L.R. 857 (1946).
81 260 P. 2d at 436.
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had to to pay the tax, which tax was disproportionate to the prob-
able returns to the city. Thus, the ordinance was an unreasonable
restraint on interstate commerce.
The dispute in the Nippert case concerned a municipal ordi-
nance imposing a similar license tax on solicitors of orders for
goods. In declaring the tax unconstitutional, the United States
Supreme Court was cognizant of the fact that there was a variance
between the effect of the tax upon the drummer and upon the
local salesman in that the flat license tax lacked any proportion
to the number or length of visits, the volume of business, or return
from the business, and, therefore, meant a stoppage of a large
amount of commerce. Mr. Justice Rutledge concluded:
The tax, by reason of those variations, cannot be taken to apply
generally to local distributors in the same manner and with like effects
as in application to out-of-state distributors. The very difference in
locations of their business headquarters, if any, and of their activities
makes this impossible. This, of course, is but another way of saying
that the very difference between interstate and local trade, taken in
conjunction with the inherent character of the tax, makes equality of
application as between those two classes of commerce, generally speak-
ing, impossible.82
In a multitude of cases the United States Supreme Court has
illustrated that the sway of the definition of interstate commerce
has an almost limitless perimeter. The business engaged in by the
defendant solicitor was clearly interstate in character. The solici-
tations were a species of commercial intercourse among the states,
for the activity contemplated and necessarily involved the trans-
mission of goods over state lines." In his inimitable fashion Jus-
tice Cardozo stated the rationale of the common precepts respect-
ing a state's behavior in the realm of interstate commerce as fol-
lows: "What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its deal-
ings with another may not place itself in a position of economic
82 327 U. S. at 432.
83 For a relevant discussion see: Carpenter and Mardian, What Is Commerce, 22 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 398 (1949) ; Carpenter and Mardian, When Is Commerce Interstate, 22
So. Calif. L. Rev. 406 (1949).
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isolation. Formulas and catchwords are subordinate to this over-
mastering requirement." 4 However, the Commerce Clause does
not prohibit the imposition of a non-discriminatory license tax on
local sales merely because the goods come from another state. 5
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia6 is authority for the
proposition that a local government under prescribed circum-
stances may regulate interstate commerce if the regulation does
not burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. 7
Let it be assumed in favor of the instant ordinance that it
possesses all the characteristics which would stamp it as being
in harmony with the doctrine permitting local regulation of inter-
state commerce, if such regulation is not of a type which is dis-
criminatory. Then the crux of the case under discussion is reached.
Does this license fee discriminate against interstate commerce?
On its face, the argument of the court seems to stretch the
sequiturs of logic insofar as it states: the ordinance imposing the
license fee applies only to personal, face-to-face solicitations; a
poor itinerant salesman can sell only by personal door-to-door
solicitations and thus is within the application of the ordinance;
local people with financial resources sufficient to set up a place
of business can sell otherwise than by personal solicitation and
thus in some situations are outside the application of the ordi-
nance; itinerant salesmen are frequently in interstate commerce;
therefore, interstate commerce is being burdened and discrimin-
ated against.
Yet if one considers the hard facts of the typical local business
competition, the conclusion is inescapable that some local busi-
nessmen exert every possible pressure on the local law-making
body to enact any ingenious tariff device possible to drive away
34 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 527 (1935).
35 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 (1916) ; Cox, The State's Power
and Constitutional Limitations to Tax, 30 Taxes 638 (1952).
36 12 How. 299 (U.-S. 1851).
37 Morrison, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 727 (1942).
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solicitors of orders for outside goods. "Provincial interests and
local political power are at their maximum weight in bringing
about acceptance of this type of legislation.""8 Appraising the
situation in this way, one sees that in actuality the court's logic
is not so credulous as it seems on first blush.
Consequently, the facts of this Oklahoma case correctly bring
it within the doctrine that the soliciting of orders for goods to be
filled by shipment from outside the state is interstate commerce
and may not be subjected to a license tax. Solicitors who confine
their activities only to the solicitation of orders which will be fol-
lowed by shipment of goods in interstate commerce are not sub-
ject to state license taxes.39
BREAK IN TRANSIT OF AN INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
Oklahoma. When does a temporary stoppage of a shipment of
goods within a state destroy the interstate character of the ship-
ment?4" The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held in the recent case
of 300 Pin Ball, Slot or Marble Machines v. State4 that, if there
were an honest and bona fide intention of continuing the ship-
ment; then a temporary storage within Oklahoma did not termi-
nate the shipment's interstate character.
The defendants owned 300 pin ball machines in Texas, where
their operation was not illegal at the time but where the owners
knew that a legislative act would soon make such machines illegal.
To circumvent this eventuality the machines were sent in inter-
state shipment to be stored in Oklahoma. They bore labels: "To-
Taylor Warehouse, Durant, Oklahoma." The machines could be
38 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. at 434.
39 Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389 (1913) ; Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124(1910) ; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 (1903) ; Stockard v. Morgan, 185
U. S. 27 (1902) ; Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489 (1887);
see Barrett, supra note 28.
40 For excellent annotations see: 60 A.L.R. 1465 (1929) ; 155 A.L.R. 936 (1945) ; 171
A.L.R. 283 (1947) ; 78 L. ed. 138 (1934).
41 ------ Okla....... 264 P. 2d 337 (1953).
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set for amusement purposes only or for gambling purposes.
By virtue of Oklahoma law42 the local sheriff confiscated the
machines.
In upholding the confiscation the lower court excluded evidence
tending to prove that the machines had come merely to a tempo-
rary rest in Oklahoma, that it was the defendants' intention to
continue shipment to other states, and that in fact contracts for
the sale and delivery of some of the machines to other states had
been accomplished even before the machines reached Oklahoma.
The supreme court vacated the confiscation orders on the ground
that the exclusion of such evidence was erroneous and prejudicial
and held in reference to the possible cessation of the shipment's
interstate character:
If the owners and consignors were bona fide in their alleged inten-
tion not to use these machines in this state and in their intention to
continue the shipment outside this state temporary stoppage within the
state would not destroy the interstate character of the shipment and
would not subject the machines to confiscation. 43
The question of what break in transit in interstate commerce
is sufficient to terminate the interstate character of a shipment
is important in that, when the interstate transit is so broken or
interrupted in a state as to destroy its interstate character, then
the shipment loses the protection from state taxation and regula-
tion extended by the operation of the Commerce Clause of the
Federal Constitution. Most of the cases dealing with this problem
have been concerned with state taxation. From these tax cases an
insight may be gained as to how the courts determine when inter-
state protection is lost.
The general guide may be set forth that personal property mov-
ing in interstate commerce is protected from state action so long
as it possesses the quality which may be termed continuity of
42 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) §§ 969, 972-974, 976.
4s 264 P. 2d at 338.
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transit." This quality comes into existence dependent upon such
factors as the intention of the owner, the control retained by the
owner, the agency by which the transit is effected and the cause
or reason for the interruption in transit.
45
A leading case is Minnesota v. Blasius4" wherein Chief Justice
Hughes laid down the rule as follows:
Similarly the States may not tax property in transit in interstate
commerce. But by reason of a break in the transit, the property may
come to rest within a State and become subject to the power of the
State to impose a non-discriminatory property tax. . . . The "crucial
question," in determining whether the State's taxing power may thus
be exerted is that of "continuity of transit." ...
* If the interstate movement has begun, it may be regarded as
continuing, so as to maintain the immunity of the property from state
taxation, despite temporary interruptions due to the necessities of the
journey or for the purpose of facility and convenience in the course
of the movement.... The question is always one of substance, and in
each case it is necessary to consider the particular occasion or pur-
pose of the interruption....
Where property has come to rest within a State, being held there
at the pleasure of the owner, for disposal or use, so that he may dis-
pose of it either within the State, or for shipment elsewhere, as his
interest dictates, it is deemed to be part of the general mass of prop-
erty within the State and is thus subject to its taxing power.
The facts were that cattle were consigned to a commission firm
in St. Paul. They were sold to a trader who then shipped them
out of the state, but one day of his brief period of ownership
coincided with the date set by state law for levying personal
property taxes. The cattle were held not immune from state taxa-
tion because the original shipment was found to be ended, not
just suspended.
As to property in storage General Oil Co. v. Crain47 is in point.
44 11 Am. Jur., Commerce, § 71.
45 Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922).
46290 U. S. 1, 9, 10 (1933).
47 209 U. S. 211 (1908).
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Here oil was shipped from Pennsylvania to Memphis, Tennessee.
Memphis was a distribution point from which the oil was shipped
in smaller lots to Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi. The court
relied on the summary of cases in Kelley v. Rhoades," wherein
it was stated that property is subject to local taxation when it
comes to rest for an indefinite period awaiting distribution or
sale. The following statement was made:
Propery, therefore, at an intermediate point between the place of
shipment and ultimate destination, may cease to be a subject of inter-
state commerce.
4 9
A comparatively recent opinion 0 emphasizes that the con-
trolling fact is, not what ultimately happens to the goods, but the
occasion and purpose of the interruption in transit. In this case
the length of time of interruption was indefinite, and the owner
retained full freedom in determining where the goods would
finally be sent.
Again in Bacon v. Illinois5 the determinative question was
whether a shipment of grain was still moving in interstate com-
merce. A resident of Illinois had purchased the grain while it
was in transit across country. In view of the facts that the owner
held the grain in Illinois with full power over its disposition and
that it was without the control of the carriers and was not actually
being transported, it was held by Mr. Justice Hughes that "neither
the fact that the grain had come from outside the state, nor the in-
tention of the owner to send it to another state, and there to dis-
pose of it, can be deemed controlling." 2
The general rule is clear. Missouri Pacific Railway v. Schnip-
per53 asserts it to be that the continuity of an interstate journey
is not broken by an interruption in transit if there is good faith
48 188 U. S. 1 (1903).
49 209 U. S. at 229, 230.
50 Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70 (1947).
51227 U. S. 504 (1913).
52 Id. at 515, 516.
53 51 F. 2d 749 (E.D. Ill. 1931), a/I'd, 56 F. 2d 30 (7th Cir. 1932).
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intention to ship beyond the point of interruption, the interruption
is not indefinite, and the interruption is in furtherance of the
intended transportation to the ultimate destination. Only the
application is obscure.
In the Oklahoma pin ball machine case the holding that the
continuity of the machines' interstate journey had not been broken
seems to rest primarily on the good faith intention of the owners
to continue the shipment to other states. Is this reasoning sufficient
in the face of the circumstances of the case? There is no showing
as to the period of time of interruption or that it was not indefi-
nite. At least as to part of the machines the owners kept full con-
trol over their ultimate disposition. Can it be said that the pur-
pose and reason for the delay was in furtherance of the intention
to continue the interstate shipment and that the storage of these
pin ball machines in Oklahoma was caused merely by exigencies
of the means of transportation, the safety of the goods in transit,
or natural causes over which the owners had no control? It is
submitted that the fact situation is a close one, and the holding
that the pin ball machines did not forfeit their interstate immunity
might well be questioned in the light of the above authorities."
Charles W. Hall.
54 See also Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7 Va. L. Rev. 167 (1920) ; Note,
74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 390 (1926).
